By Dr. Mordechai Kedar Middle Eastern Insight. Even American arms and training, European funds and global political support  will not turn the Fatah regime in Judea and Samaria into something upon  which Israel can depend. Only the establishment of eight homogeneous tribal  states, based on the urban population, can survive for long. At the same  time, Israel must always retain control of the rural expanse to prevent it  from becoming entrenched, missile-equipped Hamas hilltops, like the hills in  southern Lebanon and the tunnel city dug under the Gaza Strip.

Why Has the Domino Effect Been Halted?
Mordechai Kedar

Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, president of Tunisia, fled his raging country this
past January 14th, after a twenty-eight day period of protests left seven
hundred dead. Husni Mubarak, president of Egypt, left office on February
11th after eighteen days of riots resulting in four hundred dead. All the
commentators spoke of the “domino effect” that would overthrow most, if not
all, Arab rulers. At this writing, and despite the ongoing protests, the
dead and the wounded in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, Syria and Iraq, two
months have passed with no other president or king resigning or being
ousted. This begs the question of why the successes in Tunisia and Egypt
have not been replicated in other Arab countries.

The answer lies in the sociology of Arab countries. In recent decades,
Tunisia and Egypt have experienced a transition from the village life to the
city; people moved to the cities individually or as part of nuclear families
comprising parents and children. They were cut off from the tribe or clan
with whom they had grown up in the desert or village, joining thousands of
city dwellers who had also abandoned traditional tribal life. These people
become part of professional organizations (e.g. unions of engineers or
merchants) formed to advance and safeguard their particular interests, and
of political-ideological societies (e.g. Socialists, Communists, Democrats
or Islamists). Members of these organizations share a common interest or
ideology, not family ties. Familial ties differ in principle from
ideological allegiances and shared concerns; while family connections cannot
be replaced, mutual interests and ideologies are subject to change.

As a result of the demographic developments in Egypt and Tunisia, a
political elite arose – people who came together on the basis of common
interest and ideology, not of familial or tribal ties. Ben Ali and Mubarak
were surrounded by those whose support was based on shared interest and
ideology, with no family obligations. By contrast, kings and presidents in
most other Arab countries rule via their tribes, whose thousands of members
are planted in the government, army, security agencies, political parties,
local authorities, government-owned companies and all key decision-making
positions. They support the head of state not for his sake or that of his
rule, but for their own sake and that of their tribe; they know that if he
falls, their heads will roll. Iraq, where Saddam Hussein placed his fellow
Dulaim tribesmen at the head of every important government body, is a
perfect example.

This is also the case in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain: When the
president or king looks behind him, he sees his brothers and his first-,
second- and third-cousins standing firm, supporting every decision he makes,
because their fate depends on his. Their struggle to remain in power is a
struggle for life in every sense of the word. It is a combination of “them
or us” and “rule or die”.

By contrast, when Ben Ali and Mubarak turned around, they saw only
supporters whose backing depended on their own strength and on their ability
to serve the interests of their own followers. As soon as these presidents
appeared weak against the masses, ministers and officials withdrew their
support, leaving them isolated.

The public in Saudi Arabia – particularly the Shi’ites in the east – is very
familiar with the mutual support system of the tribes who united to
establish the monarchy; they know full well that these tribes will fight for
their survival to the last drop of blood of the last Saudi. In Libya, both
sides continue to fight despite heavy losses and thousands of dead, because
the alternative of each is slaughter at the hands of the other. The ’Alawis
in Syria know that they will be massacred as infidels and because of the
massive Muslim blood they have shed since seizing power in 1966. In Yemen,
the Sanhan tribe of Ali Abdallah Saleh and those related to it succeeded so
far to stay in power since they are united against an opposition driven by
several agendas: There are those trying to restore independence to South
Yemen, which existed prior to 1990; some, funded by Iran, represent extreme
Shi’ite interests; and others support the Global Jihadists known as
al-Qaeda, most of whom have found refuge and shelter in Yemen’s tall, steep
and rocky mountains. In Iraq of March 2003, It is possible that Saddam
Hussein’s obduracy against the Coalition resulted from the backing of his
tribe and his belief that the Iraqi army, commanded mainly by his fellow
tribesmen, would hold its own against the international forces.

In these tribal countries, state institutions such as parliament, political
parties, the judiciary, a constitution and elections act as a modern cover
for tribal rule by the collective will and governing impulse of the dominant
tribe; this outward appearance of legitimacy enables the regime to maintain
power. The people know the truth, go out to demonstrate and the ruling
tribe shoots with intent to kill, in well-known Middle Eastern tradition.

Nevertheless, these tribal regimes are not immune forever. As long as
tribal unity hold sway, the ruling group can remain in power, withstanding
the masses at the cost of many lives, and prevailing even against Western
military forces, as in Libya. If and when there is tribal infighting and
divisiveness, the tribe will begin to function as individuals, each
concerned with their personal agenda, and the whole tribe will collapse.
The defections from the Qaddafi camp should be closely monitored, because if
they spread, he will abdicate, flee for distant refuge and leave his tribe
at the mercy of the rebels and their knives. He will try to assure the
long-term safety of his supporters, but is unlikely to succeed.

A note regarding Iran: The ayatollahs function as a tribe because powerful
religious glue binds them together and the threat from the secular majority
generates a strong and fierce loyalty among them. The Revolutionary Guards
will rule Iran under the ayatollahs’ leadership as long as they remain
united. The moment the ayatollahs and Revolutionary Guard officers begin to
fight each other, their rule of Iran will come to an end.

A Theatrical Reminder

This week saw the assassination in Jenin of the Israeli-Arab actor and
director, Juliano Mer. The murder was carried out by a member of Hamas who
did not view the theatrical activities established by Mer, in which men and
women worked together, favorably. Mer was killed because such theater does
not conform to the moral code of his murderers; after issuing warnings, they
acted against Mer as do Islamic fanatics against anyone who threatens
traditional Islamic values.

This assassination serves as a reminder to anyone who has fallen asleep on
the watch in recent years: Jenin was, and still is, a center for murderous
Jihadists, who will do away with any person who crosses the boundaries they
have set. Today it is Mer, tomorrow it is any Palestinian politician who
will make peace with Israel and agree to concessions with which the
Jihadists do not agree.

It is possible that the Hamas suspect is, indeed, the murderer and the
Palestinian Authority’s security agencies suspect his involvement because
they know him to be a Hamas member. This indicates that there is a Hamas
infrastructure in Jenin, despite its image in recent years as a quiet and
terror-free city thanks to the security forces of the Palestinian Authority.
It is thus clear once again that Israel cannot rely on the Palestinian
security apparatus which failed in June 2007 to safeguard the Authority’s
power in the Gaza Strip, and will fail again if Israel abandons Judea and
Samaria (=the West Bank).

These security agencies represent like-minded views and ideology, rather
than tribal interests; their ability to survive for long against a hostile
public is therefore limited. Even American arms and training, European
funds and global political support will not turn the Fatah regime in Judea
and Samaria into something upon which Israel can depend. Only the
establishment of eight homogeneous tribal states, based on the urban
population, can survive for long. At the same time, Israel must always
retain control of the rural expanse to prevent it from becoming entrenched,
missile-equipped Hamas hilltops, like the hills in southern Lebanon and the
tunnel city dug under the Gaza Strip.
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The article is published in the framework of the Center for the Study of the
Middle East and Islam (under formation), Bar Ilan University, Israel.
Translated by Nachama Kanner
The article is dedicated to the memory of Avraham ben Yitzhak Rosenzweig.