Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig: Why is Israel’s Government Committing Electoral Suicide?
For political scientists and anyone else following Israeli politics, it’s understood that here matters are run quite differently than almost all other democracies. Nevertheless, what’s happening lately is strange even by Israel’s “outlier” standards: like lemmings the governing coalition is jumping off the electoral cliff. How? Why? Perhaps the phenomenon is puzzling but it isn’t inexplicable.
The year prior to elections is generally characterized by a government’s policies and legislation seeking to make it more popular with the voting public. This can include tax cuts, increased social spending, and popular reforms – all part of a traditional strategy to increase electoral support and neutralize criticism.
However, when a government clearly sees that defeat is highly likely it might paradoxically double down on its core issues, even if they’re highly controversial. Putting it another way, when a leader is convinced of losing the election, core ideological goals will be pursued with vigor, even if deeply unpopular. Realizing that time is short, serious attempts are made to rush controversial reforms through the legislative process. There might also be an element of spite – a final act of raging defiance against the opposition that is about to “throw the rascals out.”
That’s what’s happening in Israel today. The government has been faced with a wave of public discontent and ongoing protests. Moreover, for the past two years Israel’s polls have consistently predicted an election debacle for today’s Right-wing coalition (winning only about 50 seats out of a minimum 61 needed to form a government). Indeed, even PM Netanyahu understands his dire situation, recently asking President Herzog for an official pardon – that would allow Bibi to continue his political career as a Member of Knesset if he loses the election, something the law doesn’t permit regarding someone under indictment or on trial (only the prime minister can continue to serve in office in such personal circumstances).
Notwithstanding such a request (the chances are considered to be low of Herzog pardoning Netanyahu without his admission of guilt), the electoral handwriting is on the wall but the ruling coalition has responded not by courting the public but rather by aggressively pushing at least four policies that are widely opposed.
First, and without a doubt the most contentious issue, is the proposed draft law basically exempting almost all ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) men from mandatory military service. True, this policy has been a source of friction for decades, with many Israelis viewing it as unfair and divisive; universal service is a cornerstone principle of Israeli society. However, post-Oct. 7 The IDF desperately needs more manpower to decrease the burden on its reserve duty soldiers, most of whom have fought for many months over the past two years. The issue, therefore, is no longer “merely” a matter of principle; it has become practically existential for Israel’s future security.
And yet, despite overwhelming opposition, the government continues to press ahead with the (non)draft law, apparently willing to risk public anger in order to satisfy its ultra-Orthodox coalition partners. With electoral defeat all but certain, PM Netanyahu is desperately trying to keep his governing coalition together until the very last date when elections must be held (late October 2026).
Second, the de facto annexation of the West Bank while closing an eye to civilian attacks on Palestinian olive groves and villages. These actions are deeply unpopular with large segments of the Israeli public, fearing the diplomatic fallout and increased international isolation, not to mention the moral consequences of unprovoked violence by wayward Israeli youth in the Territories. But here too, a bulwark of the governing coalition – the Religious Zionist party – supports such activity or at least closes its eyes to the ongoing predations. From his political perspective, the less Netanyahu does or says on the matter, the better (for him).
Third, a laissez-faire attitude regarding the wave of violence sweeping Arab towns and cities within Israel: well over 200 murders this year alone, in addition to Israeli-Arab organized crime (e.g., “protection” schemes) and family feuds. The lack of law enforcement has created a crisis that demands urgent attention, but the government’s response has been marked by inertia and neglect (only this past week seemingly waking up with large-scale arrests) – the avoidance is probably intentional given the anti-Arab animus of the Minister of National Security (Ben-Gvir).
Fourth and finally, the re-emergence of Judicial Reform. I’ll relate to this at length in a few weeks. Suffice it to say for now that during the government’s first year in office, this campaign engendered ongoing, widespread protests – and its unpopularity has not abated.
As Israel heads toward what everyone agrees is a pivotal election, the government’s present approach reminds us that politics does not always follow predictable patterns. When defeat seems certain a leader’s calculus can change, with “legacy” outweighing the need for public approval. The result: a flurry of unpopular policies, a deepening of social divisions, and desperate attempts to reshape the country’s future.
There’s a well-known phrase: “Desperate times call for desperate measures.” Its origin is less well known: the ancient Greek physician Hippocrates. Over 2000 years ago he wrote: “For extreme diseases, extreme methods of cure… are most suitable.” That might be useful for physical illnesses but hardly so for political ailments of which Israel has far too many. Adding desperate measures before the electorate can have its democratic say is not a particularly good recipe for political health.
