Soldiers and civilians looking on as the Altalena burns off the coast of Tel Aviv. Photo: GPO
Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig: The 1948 Altalena Affair: Lessons for Contemporary Lebanon and Syria
The event with the most potential for civil war within Israel was the Altalena Affair in June 1948, a few weeks after Israel declared its independence. For anyone unfamiliar with that event, here it is in brief. However, as the title of this essay suggests, that event carries an extremely important lesson today for Israel’s two northern neighbors, Lebanon and Syria.
Pre-independence, the Jewish leadership had three fighting forces to domestically harass and limit the British Mandate: Haganah (mainstream Socialist, primarily defending against local Arab marauders), Irgun (right-wing nationalist, physically attacking British Mandate forces), and Lechi (extreme right-wing; ditto). However, once Israel was established, Ben-Gurion declared that all had to subsume themselves under the newly formed Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
The Irgun, led by Menachem Begin, had managed to obtain a very large number of critical armaments overseas to supply Israel’s troops in the War of Independence against the Arab states that had attacked it. That ship was laden with the guns. As the Irgun (and Lekhi) had already joined the IDF, Begin told Ben-Gurion of the arms shipment, who then immediately ordered Begin to have the ship dock at a former Haganah port (north of Tel Aviv) so that the weapons could be safely handed over to the IDF. Begin agreed, on condition that 20% of the arms would go to his former Irgun (now IDF) soldiers. Ben-Gurion refused to allow this dual-track arms supply. When the boat docked and the Irgun soldiers refused to hand over the weapons (notwithstanding Ben-Gurion’s orders), the (now) IDF was given the order to fire on the boat which exploded. Mutual shooting commenced, killing 16 members of the Irgun and 3 IDF soldiers.
What did Begin do? He went on the radio and ordered his Irgun soldiers not to fight the IDF: “Don’t raise a hand against a brother, not even today. It is forbidden for Jewish arms to be used against Jewish fighters” – this despite the huge anger against Ben-Gurion for his deadly directive. The tragic event basically ended there. The IDF stayed united – and ultimately won Israel’s War of Independence.
Who was right? In the long run, clearly Ben-Gurion did what had to be done, but Begin displayed the highest level of moral courage in the aftermath of the whole affair. As someone who was deeply knowledgeable about Jewish history (especially the infighting 2000 years ago that led to the Second Temple’s destruction, and with it any hope of national sovereignty or even autonomy under the Romans), Begin understood full well what a civil war would lead to. One nation, with one army – that was the only way to guarantee political stability and realistic national security.
In Lebanon and Syria today, the reverse is the case. For different historical reasons (Lebanon, longstanding social fissures; Syria, over a decade’s worth of rebellion), both countries suffer heavily from the same syndrome: multiple armies – in large part a result of several religious and ethnic groups.
Lebanon has its (weak) official army alongside the (formerly dominant) Hezbollah militia. Israel is insisting that the latter be subsumed into the former, or at the least the Lebanese Army become the country’s dominant force. Otherwise, in a few years Israel would once again find itself facing a resurgent Hezbollah with all the security instability that entails. The recent election of General Aoun as Lebanon’s new president is a step in the right direction, as he immediately chose a new prime minister without Hezbollah’s backing.
Syria is in an even more precarious situation, given that the country is “home” to several different “armies”: Kurds, Shiite, Sunni, ISIS extremists, and so on. The new government there is slowly trying to bring them all into one big “Syrian Army” tent – an almost impossible task given the multiple (and contradictory) demands of some of these militia groups. None want to have their own Altalena, but some deeply distrust the new (formerly jihadist) government. Thus, they aren’t willing to give up their arms and military structure without receiving ironclad guarantees that if they were to do so there wouldn’t be bloodletting (a la the firings on the Altalena nearly 77 years ago.) Here too there’s room for modest hope, given that Iran has been practically shut out of the country – leaving Hezbollah in Lebanon in an even more weakened position without its traditional, Syrian, arms transit route.
Beyond the purely national security aspect of a united army, for every country the benefit is national-social. Indeed, perhaps the army’s primary role is to enable a “coming-together” of any country’s multiple groups i.e., to function as the central “melting pot” in which each group can learn about each other first-hand, and ultimately start to trust the “other” in their midst. The armies of mono-ethnic countries such as Norway or even Saudi Arabia don’t have to carry out such a role because their societies start with a homogeneous ethnicity and culture. But once a country is split along “cultural” lines (religion, ethnicity, ideology, etc.), the army becomes the main vector through which national unity can be built.
The IDF today is a highly successful “national assimilator.” It started off on the wrong foot with the Altalena Affair, but its leaders quickly understood the dangers of army fragmentation (or worse). The present Lebanese and Syrian leadership seem to also understand this. The question is whether even so, they can avoid their own Altalena and progress to a semblance of true national unification.
