The Israel Policy Forum presents a conversation with Warren Bass a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation, working on national security issues including the Middle East and counterterrorism. This conversation presents a point of view that is often not heard very much with the slinging of mud and arrows by the left and the right.
Warren Bass served in the State Department from 2009-11 as director of speechwriting and senior policy adviser to Ambassador Susan E. Rice, the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations and a member of President Obama’s cabinet. Bass worked on U.S. policy on issues including the Arab revolutions of 2011, the Palestinians’ bid for UN membership, Egypt’s transition from authoritarianism, the controversy over the UN Human Rights Council’s Goldstone Report, Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts, and the UN tribunal on Lebanon. Before joining the Obama administration, Bass was a senior editor at The Washington Post, first as the paper’s nonfiction book review editor and then as deputy editor of Outlook, the paper’s Sunday commentary section. Bass is the author of Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance, published in 2003 by Oxford University Press.
You can hear the interview here: http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/interview/international-community-and-middle-east
Note: This transcript has been edited for clarity. The conversation took place on February 22, 2012.
Steven Spiegel: Let’s talk about the Obama era at the United Nations. From what you saw, how would you describe America’s defense of Israel at the United Nations?
Warren Bass: I would call it pretty vigorous and sustained. The Obama administration came into office believing, as it still does, that the UN is an important forum for bringing together the international community to find common solutions to common problems in the 21st century. That said, I think the administration has continued to be clear-eyed about the UN’s flaws, and one of those is its tendency to single out Israel in unfair ways. The net effect of that, I think, is that the administration has wound up on a day-in, day-out basis standing up for fair and equal treatment for Israel at the UN. This was guidance that came from the President and Secretary of State Clinton and Ambassador Rice on down to my rather modest level. It was very clear that the senior leadership of the administration was troubled by the way Israel was singled out at the UN and wanted it stopped. Ambassador Rice, I should say, has used some very strong language about this. She called the type of bashing Israel often comes in for at the UN “relentless, obsessive, and ugly”—which it is not terribly diplomatic language but, unfortunately, I think is quite accurate.
Do you think that the treatment of Israel today is worse, better, or the same as previous periods?
I think the all-time nadir for treatment of Israel at the UN was the infamous ‘Zionism is racism’ resolution. Branding the Jewish self-determination movement as a form of racism was a low that is unlikely to be topped, we hope. But I think there is still a significant problem in terms of the way Israel gets unfairly treated, and the President himself raised this in his speech at the UN General Assembly in 2010. He said that “efforts to chip away is Israel’s legitimacy would only be met by the unshakable opposition of the United States,” and I think you see that in the day-in and day-out of American policy, and on a range of issues.
Just to tick off some of the most prominent: there was the Palestinian bid last September for UN membership. While that is obviously still an extremely delicate situation, and it would be unwise to make bold predictions about how that will continue to turn out, they just didn’t have the votes required in the Security Council, and the landscape is not that different right now. Now, obviously, that remains tenuous, and things can change quickly.
There was also an attempt by the Palestinians in February 2011 to insert the Security Council into the settlement issue. That triggered a veto from Ambassador Rice, which is still the first and only veto that the Obama administration has cast in the Security Council.
The United States also refused to participate in the ten-year commemoration of the 2001 Durban Conference because the administration felt that the Durban process, which is supposed to be an anti-racism process, has been marred all the way along by ugly displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism.
There was a huge fight, as you know, over the release of the Human Rights Council’s Goldstone Report into the 2008-2009 war in Gaza. The United States under this administration said that the report was deeply flawed and stood up strongly for Israel’s right to defend itself. The United States voted against a barrage of Goldstone-related resolutions in both the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.
This, I think, gives you some sense of the scope of it, but really, in my personal experience—and I should say that I don’t speak for the administration or for RAND and am speaking strictly as a private citizen today—this was something Ambassador Rice and the rest of her team were dealing with on a pretty daily basis, and the record, I think, is very hard to criticize from a fair-minded point of view.
How do you explain the repeated successes? I must say I have been surprised by the ability to thwart the Palestinian effort the UN. A lot of people suggested that the Palestinians would waltz in and do quite well and would do similarly well with the Goldstone Report. Without being partisan towards this administration or others, it is a record of wins. How do you explain that ability? Has the administration done something right, have the Israelis done something right, has the ardor for supporting anything the Palestinians come up with cooled? I am at a bit of a loss to put a marker on it. If it is the administration’s doing, what did they do right that other administrations didn’t do to have these successes?
Well, I think one of the elements behind some of these successes was just really good, ongoing, and sustained cooperation between the UN teams and the teams back in Washington and Jerusalem, for both the Obama administration and the Netanyahu administration, who worked really closely together. Just as one example, Gabriela Shalev, the first Israeli permanent representative that the administration dealt with, personally had a very warm relationship with my old boss, Ambassador Rice. They really worked well together, and part of that was the fact that Ambassador Shalev had a view of Israel at the UN pursuing a positive agenda that went beyond the conflict and sought to have Israel as a full participating member of the UN, with all of the rights and responsibilities of any member state. That was something we were enthusiastic to get behind, including trying to get the Israelis into the consultative bodies at the UN, which enable Israel to be a full member of the UN. The administration had good successes getting Israel into an important consultation group known as JUSCANZ, which helps coordinate positions before committee meetings and debates at UN bodies. JUSCANZ, by the way, is one of these absurd UN acronyms; it stands for Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and it sometimes has a few members beyond them.
Now, just to take the two examples that you mentioned very briefly, the Goldstone Report and the Palestinian bid for UN membership. On Goldstone, something fascinating and I think unexpected that happened over the course of that long and quite painful debate was that Justice Goldstone himself actually wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post in which he recanted some of the core conclusions of his own report. I think that was not something anyone in the administration thought we were necessarily going to get. There were people across the administration, including in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and what is known as “L” at the State Department, the legal adviser’s office under the brilliant Harold Koh, all of whom came together with a very sustained and principled critique of the Goldstone Report. I think it was surprising—certainly to myself—to see Justice Goldstone recant some of his core conclusions.
In terms of the Palestinians’ UN gambit, there was an underlying American position which I think some people had quite a bit of sympathy for, perhaps more so at the Security Council than in the General Assembly. The administration point of view was this conflict could only be resolved through the creation of an independent and viable Palestinian state, and that can only come through direct negotiations and a negotiated two-state solution with Israel and Palestine, a future state of Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security. And that just wasn’t going to happen through shortcuts at the UN. When the Palestinians did bring their application for UN membership forward in September, the Security Council went through its traditional process, which includes considering the application in a Security Council membership committee. There are a lot of lawyers and discussion and debate and analysis, and then that membership committee forwards a report to the Security Council. And that is basically where it stayed. I think that was not necessarily where the Palestinians thought it would go. I really don’t want to be in the prediction business on where this goes, but I think it is worth noting that in late January, Ambassador Rice said that while she didn’t want to make any rock-solid commitments about it, she thought that if the Palestinians were weighing their choices with respect to the Security Council, they would be doing so today in a fairly similar landscape to what they dealt with back in the fall.
It is interesting that the administration has been so successful in blocking the Palestinians at the UN, but unsuccessful in its attempt to get genuine peace talks going, and even while moving to the Quartet in which the UN participates, they haven’t had that much success. How would you assess this effort—a great success at the UN and not so much success outside of the UN? What has the UN offered? The UN usually is seen as the great garbage can of Israeli initiatives, and yet it hasn’t worked out that way in recent years.
The administration, I think, has been fairly clear—along lines that I think will be fairly familiar to those who subscribe to some of the views of the Israel Policy Forum—that the only way for a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace is two states for two peoples. The question of actually getting there, I think, is very difficult. Often, Arab-Israeli peacemaking comes after moments of agony in the region or after unexpected breakthroughs—above all, Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, but also the incredible hopes of the handshake between Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn in September 1993. I think it is very difficult to try to resolve excruciating issues at a time when the parties, to some degree, don’t feel that much impetus to move because the status quo is not that unbearable. But to my mind, the dilemmas are not going to change; only the body count is. I think the parties are much better off, particularly at this moment of change in the Middle East, moving forward and actually taking a deal along the lines that has been suggested by senior administration policymakers, including the president’s remarks in May, which lay out the overall administration view of the right way forward. Nobody else has really seemed to suggest a better way ahead than that, but it is very frustrating. There are a few small green shoots of hope that we have seen in recent weeks, notably when Jordan brought the parties together for several direct meetings in coordination with the Quartet. It didn’t get a huge amount of attention, but it was noteworthy just the same. These were the type of direct talks that people have been pushing and prodding and hoping for, though the question of whether it is possible to move forward is still being wrangled about. It does sound as if the Israelis came to the table with some sort of offering, and we will, I guess, get more clarity as to what exactly that was. Netanyahu has done something no Likud prime minister has ever done and come out in favor of a two-state solution in a speech a couple of years ago, which is something that is striking to hear from a Likud prime minister. But actually operationalizing that takes some guts and means running some risks. I think the United States will continue keep up its bipartisan commitment to be there, to let Palestinians see that negotiations can lead to real statehood, to let Israelis see that negotiations can led to more security rather than less, and to make clear that the United States will make the risks for peace less scary for leaders who are willing to run them in good faith.
Let’s move on to the rest of the Middle East. How would you describe the general success and also the experience of the United States in the last three years on this very active period in the Middle East with the Arab Spring and Iran and many other issues?
I think there are a few stand-out moments that I saw or was tangentially involved with in my previous job. The first of those relates to Iran, where in June 2010, with leadership being driven quite directly by the President and Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice, the Security Council passed Resolution 1929—a really tough sanctions resolution, the toughest sanctions on the books today against any UN member state. Because it is a Security Council resolution, it is binding on all UN member states, including all Security Council members and including UN members that may differ from the U.S. on some aspects of Iran policy. Resolution 1929 was supported by Russia, China, by the full P5, the full five permanent members of the Security Council, and it not only dealt with Iran’s ability to acquire financing and materials and support necessary for a nuclear arms program, it also opened the door for further national sanctions from the United States, which were passed through the Congress, and from the EU, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and some Arab states, and others. You see this today, where there are hints that countries in Asia are not going to buy as much crude from Iran. It is really making a difference, I think. That was a major step forward.
Can you say the UN resolution actually accelerated the process of sanctioning Iran? That however strong it was, the sanctions that are currently being debated and implemented are much stronger, and in a sense, the toughest UN resolution ever opened the doors for even greater activity on that front?
I think that is exactly what you see today. As one straw in the wind, you not only have Iran today talking about cutting off all oil sales to the EU, which makes up about 19 percent of Iran’s oil sales, but you also had, on February 22nd, Reuters reporting that China, India, and Japan are planning cuts of at least 10 percent in Iranian crude imports. Those three countries together buy about 45 percent of Iran’s crude exports, which is a serious sign that we are in a different type of era of sanctioning against Iran. Much of that is due to the president’s emphasis on working through the UN, bringing the world together on this, and bringing Iran to a moment of isolation the likes of which it has not experienced.
Let’s move on to the rest of the Middle East, the Arab Spring, the countries that have been affected and involved, and the surprisingly substantial role the UN has played here. So you must have many comments on that.
I think the most striking of those was one of the great struggles of the Arab Awakening, Libya. You had the fairly quick departure of Ben Ali from Tunisia, the incredible revolution in Tahrir Square that toppled the Mubarak regime, and then Qaddafi’s determination to hunt his people down like rats, as he put it, rather than let them have the universal rights that they were standing up for. Last week marked the one-year anniversary of the revolution in Libya, and it is actually startling to think that it was just about a year ago that Qaddafi’s forces were at the gates of Benghazi, and the entire country of Libya was being menaced by one of the world’s longest-serving dictators—and now he is gone. Much of that did come through Security Council Resolution 1973, in which the United States outlined in great specificity inside the Council what it envisioned doing together with NATO and NATO’s Arab partners, both in terms of air strikes and in terms of actions on the ground. This was a resolution that didn’t simply authorize a no-fly zone, with planes hovering overhead that weren’t in a position to do what was necessary to protect civilians on the ground. It had the authority to make sure that civilians were protected on the ground and that there was not an Srebrenica-style massacre inside Benghazi. The Security Council gave that authority, and not a single Security Council country voted against it. I think it made a huge and life-saving difference, and one that I think is worth noting. I think the Arab Awakening would look quite different if Qaddafi had been able to hang on through truly brutal use of force.
What is the precedent of Libya? Obviously people think of Syria. What is happening next, what has the effect been? I have students asking me all the time, why isn’t the international community doing more about Syria?
I think there is a serious roadblock in terms of Security Council action on Syria in the form of Russia and China, who vetoed not one but two Security Council draft resolutions on Syria. The first one, back in October, was a strictly hortatory resolution; it didn’t have sanctions in it. The one Russia and China vetoed quite recently was a resolution that endorsed the transition plan that is being put forth by the Arab League. The guts of that vetoed Security Council resolution was then given to the UN General Assembly, which overwhelmingly got behind what the Arab League, Turkey, and others have been calling for, which is for Assad to step down. He has lost whatever scant legitimacy the Ba’ath Party dictatorship ever had in Syria, and it’s past time to pave a way for a transition in which all Syrian voices can be heard. The Russians and Chinese have come up with a policy that is simultaneously brainless, ruthless, and heartless. Vladimir Putin may be the only major international leader who truly believes Bashar al-Assad has a real long-term future as the leader of Syria. I think over time this issue will continue to come back to the Security Council as the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate. I do hope that the Russians and the Chinese will at some point listen to the voices of the Syrian people—to the incredible bravery that it has taken the Syrian protestors to be back out on the streets week in, week out, knowing the degree of force that is going to be hurled against them by an utterly ruthless regime. It is really one of the most striking things that we have seen throughout the Arab Awakening, and Russia and China are just on the wrong side of it.
How do you explain the difference in Russian and Chinese policy towards Libya vs. Syria?
I think the Russians and Chinese have tried to re-write the history of what they actually voted for in Resolution 1973, which is the Libya resolution in the Security Council. There has been a post-Libya dynamic which has unfortunately limited the Council’s ability to live up to its responsibilities during this ongoing emergency in Syria. I think that the Russians and the Chinese understood what was in Resolution 1973, understood how it was going to be implemented, and they continue to look for excuses in order to avoid involvement in Syria. I think it is regrettable, and I do think that, even from their point of view, it is untenable over time. I do think sooner or later, this is going to have to keep coming back, and I think the administration has signaled a willingness to work with the Russians and Chinese to deal with reasonable objections. The Russians have come back with wrecking amendments designed to blow resolutions up, and I do hope that, over time, they can be brought to a more reasonable posture that shows some awareness of what’s going on on the ground. If they don’t, I think people in the Arab world are noticing. They see what Russia and China are doing, and they can see very clearly who is on the side of Syrian protestors showing incredible moral courage, and they see who is on the side of a regime that is shooting them down with vicious brutality, and they see who is selling the weapons. This has not escaped the notice of the people of the Middle East, and I think the Russians and the Chinese may find this extremely shortsighted in the years ahead.
You seem to suggest that a lot more would be done vis-à-vis Syria and ousting the regime by the international community if the Russians and Chinese had not vetoed. But the United States and other countries have lots of vehicles outside of the UN Security Council; as you have pointed out, they have gone to the General Assembly, which doesn’t have enforcement ability, but still there is now a moral authority action against the Assad regime. If I am correct in my inference, why would a veto at the UN Security Council make such a difference?
I think that the vetoes at the Security Council were the Russians’ and Chinese’s way of telling us that they were still willing to shelter Assad from the international consensus of horror at what the Assad regime is doing. I think that part of the way of getting a message through to Assad does have to do with increasing the pressure and isolation on his regime, to try to induce him to change force, and pressure in Security Council sanctions would be very effective for laying the tables in these types of decisions. As we have seen on Iran, there are certainly things can be done individually elsewhere. Victoria Nuland and Jay Carney in their briefings at the State Department and the White House respectively on February 22nd made it clear that if Assad won’t yield to the pressure the international community is bringing, the U.S. and others may have to consider additional measures. For the time being, those spokesman are not speculating on what those measures could be, but they are also affirmatively not taking anything off the table.
Some people have speculated that there is a real difference in the Russian and Chinese positions. The Russians are much more committed to the Assad regime, and with the Chinese, there is much more movement in bringing them away from the Russian position. Do you see any of that as a possibility?
I do see it as a possibility. First of all, the Russian arms relationship is just a different order of magnitude. According to Reuters, Russia sold Damascus nearly one billion dollars worth of arms last year, and that includes missile systems. These are big-ticket items, and there are also Kremlin cronies who don’t want to see some of the related skimming off the top go away. Plus there is a certain view in the Kremlin that they have just been doing business with the Assad regime for so long that friends don’t abandon friends—it is just not what they do. I do think that China is in a somewhat different position, and I think one potential tealeaf on this is that post-Ben Ali Tunisia is hosting a ministerial conference on Syria at the end of the week. Tunisians has invited more than 70 countries. The Russians have said they are not going. The initiation explicitly calls this a meeting in support of the Syrian people and in support of the Arab League initiative for a political transition—the same Arab League initiative that Russia and China vetoed in that Security Council draft resolution. If China does accept Tunisia’s invitation to go to this “Friends of Syria” ministerial conference at the end of the week, that would be a really interesting sign. That is one that I will be watching with great interest.
If we look at the entire sad saga of the Syrian uprising, the Israelis are absent; they have taken no stand, and that is probably a very wise policy. At the UN or elsewhere, have the Israelis done anything, or have they just watched and waited?
My sense is that the Israelis have basically watched and waited. I think the Israelis understand that they have very little ability to influence what is going on inside Syria. That is an issue of Syrian people rising up against this narrow minority dictatorship. There are some interesting strategic opportunities for Israel in the uprising, but I think the Israelis basically recognize that they don’t have much ability to influence this and are best off letting this unfold without inserting themselves into the issue.
There are some dangers for Israel as well. If the uprising results in instability—and you see some of that in Libya—the Israelis have found a certain comfort in the Assad’s control, and that is lost forever. I would imagine that Israelis are very nervous, but it has taken a degree of professionalism to hold back anyway.
Stern restraint is not always the hallmark of Israeli diplomacy, but on this particular issue, I think they have played it quite professionally.
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Israel Policy Forum (IPF) builds mainstream leadership support for responsible U.S. diplomacy to achieve a sustainable, negotiated two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict through advocacy, education and policy research.
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Israel Policy Forum (IPF) was founded in 1993, with the encouragement of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, to serve as a strong American base of support for the active and sustained U.S. diplomatic efforts needed to assist the State of Israel in its pursuit of lasting peace and security. Ever since, IPF’s program, policy and advocacy initiatives have served to mobilize community and policy leaders toward constructive efforts to advance Mideast peace and security. IPF has also provided high-level platforms for key policymakers to address Mid-dle East peacemaking efforts, including President Bill Clinton, who announced the “Clinton Parameters” for Middle East peace at an IPF event in 2001.
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