Dr. Robert O. Freedman
By Dr. Robert O. Freedman.
Ideally, relations between two allied countries are composed of both common interests and common values. This has been the case in US-Israeli relations since 1967, when strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union and its Arab allies was reinforced by the fact that both the United States and Israel were vibrant democracies. When only common interests hold two countries together, the relationship is far less solid, as in the case when the United States cooperated with the Soviet Union during World War Two against Nazi Germany, only to drift into the Cold War immediately thereafter when Germany had been defeated. In the case of Israel and Turkey, initially there were both common interests and common values when the relationship between the two countries reached their zenith in the late 1990’s, as both countries opposed Syria and were the only genuine democracies in the authoritarian Middle East. In the last decade, however, and especially since the coming to power of the Islamist AKP(Justice and Development) Party in 2002, relations between the two countries have deteriorated as their common interests disappeared, and Turkey was transformed from a secularist democracy to an increasingly intolerant Islamist state. Indeed, the future of the Turkish-Israeli relationship appears to be dependent on whether the AKP is again victorious in next year’s Turkish election.
I. THE FORMATION OF THE TURKISH-ISRAELI ALLIANCE
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey, which had prided itself as being the southern bastion of NATO against the Soviet Union, looked around for a new foreign policy focus. One renewed goal was the entry into the European Union(EU), which Turkey had been seeking to enter for a number of decades. Another goal was to step into what Turkish leaders thought would be a political vacuum in Central Asia and Azerbaizhan following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the independent states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaizhan—all of whom had a Turkic heritage. The Turkish leaders quickly found, however, that the leaders of the new states had no desire to replace one “big brother:” (Russia) with another “big brother” (Turkey). In any case, The Turkish leadership soon found itself embroiled in the rapidly escalating civil war with its Kurdish community, led by the terrorist PKK organization, particularly in the southeast part of Turkey. The Kurdish revolt was aided and abetted by Syria, which harbored the Kurdish opposition leader, Abdullah Ocalan..The defensive agreement between Greece—another enemy of Turkey— and Syria in 1995 prompted Turkey to respond and in 1996 a major defense agreement between Israel and Turkey was signed which forced Syria, which borders Turkey on its north and Israel on its southwest to divide its military forces. In addition, the agreement enabled Israeli pilots to train in Turkey, Turkish pilots to train in Israel, and provided for extensive anti-terrorism cooperation. The close defensive relationship was also to lead to major Israeli arms deals with Turkey, particularly of refurbished and upgraded tanks and planes. By the late 1990’s, the Turkish-Israeli agreement had begun to pay major dividends to Turkey. In 1998, Turkey issued an ultimatum to Syria to expel Ocalan or face a Turkish invasion. With Israeli military forces on its southern border on the Golan Heights, Syria had no choice but to comply with the Turkish demand, and Ocalan was expelled, later to be captured by the Turks with the help of both US and Israeli intelligence, an event that lead to a ceasefire between the Kurds and Turkey. The tie with Israel paid other dividends to Turkey as well. By the late 1990’s Diaspora Armenians had begun to pressure the US Congress to enact a resolution stating that the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of the Turkish Republic, had committed genocide against its Armenian population during World War One. With the help of the Israel Lobby in the United States, Turkey was able to prevent the passage of the resolution. Still another benefit of the close tie to Israel was Turkey’s ability to partially neutralize the anti-Turkish policies of the Greek Lobby in the US which had opposed American arms sales to Turkey. Israel was also helpful to Turkey by rescuing a number of Turks following Turkey’s very serious earthquake in 1999, and the two countries, plus the United States, began to cooperate in a series of military exercises, code-named “Reliant Mermaid” . Meanwhile, Israeli visitors were flocking to Turkey, which had become a favorite tourist destination for Israeli tourists. Trade also rose rapidly between the two countries, crossing the $1 billion mark in 2002 and reaching $3.5 billion in 2008, with Israel exporting military equipment to Turkey and Turkish construction firms undertaking a number of projects in Israel. This warm relationship between Turkey and Israel, however, was to change during the first decade of the 21st Century, in part because of a change of Turkish interests, and in part because Turkey’s new leadership brought an increasingly Islamist focus to Turkish foreign policy.
II. TURKEY CHANGES COURSE
There were a series of reasons for the change in Turkey’s foreign policy direction, a number of which preceded the AKP’s rise to power in 2002, but were strongly reinforced by Turkey’s Islamist leadership. First, following an earthquake in Greece in 1999, Turkey sent aid to Greece, just as Greece had aided Turkey after its earthquake the same year. This led to a gradual rapprochement between the two one-time enemies. In addition, following the ouster of Ocalan from Syria, there was a gradual improvement of Turkish-Syrian relations, one that accelerated once Bashar Assad had succeeded his father Hafiz Assad in June 2000. Third, Russian-Turkish relations, which had been in a state of confrontation throughout most of the 1990s because of differences over the Kurds and Chechens, as well as Russian military aid to Greece, began to improve as the Russians agreed to sell Turkey large amounts of natural gas Fourth, although Turkey was accepted for candidacy in the European Union in 1999—and was told it had to undertake a series of domestic reforms to gain admittance–, a series of developments made the Turks realize that their chances for entry into the EU were growing dimmer. These events included the Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 9/11, similar Islamist bombings in London and Madrid, the murder of a Dutch film-maker by an Islamist terrorist, and the Moslem riots following the publication of cartoons of Mohamed in Denmark—all of which convinced increasing numbers of Europeans that Islamic values were not congruent with those of Europeans, and reinforced the opposition of a number of European leaders to the entry of Moslem Turkey to the EU. Under these circumstances, Turkish leaders began to look to the Middle East as a new focus for their trade and foreign policy. This policy direction was reinforced when the AKP Party led by Recip Erdogan took power in Turkey in 2002. While Erdogan came from an Islamist background— indeed he had been jailed for his Islamist views—he and his party ran on a platform of moderation and the AKP victory came in large part because of a backlash by the Turkish electorate against the extensive corruption of the secular parties. Soon after taking office, Erdogan was confronted by a major foreign policy problem—the US invasion of Iraq. The invasion had three major negative consequences for Turkey and for US-Turkish relations. First, the US invasion raised the possibility of an independent Kurdistan bordering southeast Turkey, which could have a major irredentist pull on the loyalty of the Turkish Kurds. Second, perhaps seeing a new opportunity, the Turkish Kurds renewed their guerrilla war against the government of Turkey. Finally, the US was angry that the Turkish Parliament did not approve the entry of US forces into Iraq via Turkey. The invasion was to lead to a deterioration of US-Turkish relations, and to a sharp rise in state-supported anti-American propaganda in the Turkish media.
In addition to the challenge of having to deal with the war in Iraq, the new AKP government continued the process of improving relations with its neighbors, Greece, Syria, and Russia which had been begun by its predecessors. Indeed, Erdogan’s advisor, Ahmet Davutoglu, who was later to become Turkey’s Foreign Minister, crystallized this policy, calling for a “Zero Problems” policy toward Turkey’s neighbors, and this included a gradual improvement of relations not only with Iraq, but also with the leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan.It should be noted in this context that with fewer, or no, enemies, Turkey would have less need for a strong army, the main bastion of Turkish secularism. However, Erdogan added another dimension to this “Zero Problems” policy—an Islamist one. Thus he made a major effort to improve relations with the Islamic republic of Iran and embraced Hamas—despite the fact that both Iran and Hamas had openly called for Israel’s destruction. Thus in 1994 Erdogan made a formal visit to Iran and when, in the same year, Israel killed Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin, Erdogan called the Israeli act, “State Terrorism”, and temporarily withdrew the Turkish ambassador from Israel. Then, when Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council Election, its leaders were invited to visit Turkey. To Erdogan, an Islamic Foreign Policy meant not only Islamic solidarity, but also the concept that Moslems can do no wrong—and that non-Moslems who act against Moslems should be severely censured. This view was increasingly evident on state-controlled TV, leading the American Council on Jewish-Turkish relations, to issue the following declaration when Erdogan visited the United States in June 2005:
“ As we voice our support for Turkey, we hope to hear Prime Minister Erdogan’s confirmation of Turkey’s commitment to a strong and durable alliance with the
United States, his unequivocal denunciation of frequent anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in the Turkish media, and his determination to curb them”
Erdogan, however, did not curb the anti-Americanism and the anti-Semitism in the Turkish media and this was to set the scene for a further deterioration of both Turkish-American and Turkish-Israeli relations.
Meanwhile, Erdogan’s domestic agenda during his first term in office consisted of seeking to implement reforms that would enhance Turkey’s possibilities of entry into the EU—however distant that prospect. These included improving the conditions of the Kurds, and curbing the power of Turkey’s military which was not only a bastion of Turkish secularism but also a major political power in Turkish society. This effort was to intensify during Erdogan’s second term. He also sought to allow women to wear headscarves to state buildings(including universities) and to state events—an attempt that was rebuffed by the Turkish courts which were also major advocates of secularism
III ERDOGAN’S SECOND TERM—THE MOVE TO ANTI-ISRAELI RADICALISM
Reelected with 47% of the vote (compared to 37% in 2002) Erdogan set out immediately to attack and weaken the Turkish military which had strongly opposed his election. Thus he commenced an investigation of the so-called Ergenekon plot of the Turkish Military, which Erdogan claimed was a plot to overthrow his government. However, not only were high ranking military officers arrested, but so too were a number of secular opponents of his regime. This action both angered and worried Turkish secularists who feared for the future of secularism in Turkey. As a further example of Erdogan’s growing authoritarianism, his government imposed a multi-billion dollar fine on the owner of a Turkish media outlet which opposed him. This raised questions both in Turkey and in the EU about the freedom of the press in Turkey. Erdogan’s acts against the Turkish media may well have been related to attempts to stifle discussion of corruption charges against members of the AKP, which not only sullied the reputation of the ruling party, but also lessened its chances to be reelected. In a further effort to weaken his secular opposition, Erdogan, in an action reminiscent of US President Franklin Roosevelt’s attempt to “pack” the US Supreme Court, tried to push a series of amendments through the Turkish Parliament, the most important of which would enable Erdogan and the AKP majority in Parliament to add their supporters to secular dominated judicial institutions such as the Turkish Supreme Court. While Erdogan was unable to push these amendments through the Parliament, he secured sufficient votes to put them to a national referendum, which will take place in September 2010.
In the area of foreign policy, Erdogan also embarked on a more radical Islamist policy. Thus he publicly welcomed the President of Sudan, Hassan al-Bashir, who had been indicted by the International Criminal Court for genocide. When asked how he could so warmly welcome someone indicted for genocide, Erdogan replied “It is not possible for a Moslem to commit genocide”. He also sought to mediate(with the help of Brazil) a solution to the Iranian nuclear problem—an effort that angered the United States which saw it as a possible diversion from the sanctions against Iran which the US wanted the UN Security Council to impose. When Turkey subsequently voted against the sanctions resolution, US-Turkish relations were chilled further. Erdogan, who by now was seeing Turkey, as a major Middle East mediator, also sought to mediate between Israel and Syria, but this effort ended in December 2008 when Israel invaded Gaza to put an end to rocket attacks, an action, as will be noted below, that was severely condemned by Erdogan.Other foreign policy initiatives of Erdogan included a move to greatly improve ties to Armenia—a preliminary treaty was signed in October 2009—but one that depended on Armenia making concessions to Azerbaizhan part of whose territory(Nagorno-Karabakh) Armenia had seized in their 1993 war..Nonetheless, once the treaty had been signed, an AKP leader reportedly said “ Now we don’t need the Jews any more”, a reference to the aid American Jews, as part of the Israeli Lobby, had given to Turkey in the US Congress to prevent the passing of an Armenian genocide resolution. A final initiative Erdogan made was an opening to Turkey’s Kurds, by offering an amnesty to those members of the PKK who returned to Turkey peacefully from their bases in Iraqi Kurdistan.
However, the major change in Turkey’s foreign policy came in the sharp deterioration of relations with Israel, a deterioration that appears to have been carefully orchestrated by Erdogan himself. In January 2009, following the Israeli invasion of Gaza, Erdogan bitterly attacked Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum. Addressing Peres, Erdogan stated “When it comes to killing, you well know how to kill”, and then stormed out of the meeting. When Erdogan returned to Turkey, he was greeted with cheers, perhaps convincing him that an anti-Israeli policy would play well in Turkish politics. Then during 2009, a very anti-Israel and anti-Semitic TV series was telecast on Turkish national TV, which depicted Israeli soldiers as deliberately murdering Palestinian babies. When Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon confronted the Turkish Ambassador about this, Erdogan responded by calling Israel ”the greatest threat to peace in the Middle East”. Erdogan followed up his criticism by canceling Israeli participation in the Reliant Mermaid joint exercise with the United States that was to take place, in part, in Turkey. These actions set the stage for Erdogan’s behavior during the aftermath of the flotilla incident which took place at the end of May 2010. It should be noted that the Turkish ship in the flotilla,the only one that resisted the Israeli takeover, had been organized by the IHH, an Islamic “charity” association in Turkey that had been involved in past terrorism, including, according to a French magistrate who investigated the organization, the attempt to blow up Los Angeles International Airport and contacts with al-Qaeda. It is clear that the IHH was trying to provoke a conflict with Israel—for some of the Islamists involved in the operation, it provided a path to martyrdom, and Erdogan seized on the deaths of 9 members of the organization to escalate his conflict with Israel. He demanded an apology from Israel, and threatened to cut all ties with Israel unless the apology was forthcoming. Initially, it appeared he could exploit the conflict for major domestic political gain, as even the main Turkish opposition parties, the CHP and the MHP, also condemned the Israeli attack. Nonetheless, it remained to be seen if Erdogan can ride an anti-Israeli policy to reelection in next year’s Turkish elections, given the major domestic and foreign policy problems now plaguing the AKP.
IV THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS
In the last year Erdogan has encountered a series of foreign policy and domestic problems that threaten the chances of the AKP in next year’s elections. First, his intitiative to improve relations with Armenia appears to have foundered as the Armenians have refused to make concessions to Azerbaizhan. As Turkish-Armenian relations began to deteriorate, Diaspora Armenians again raised the genocide issue in the US Congress, and without the Israeli Lobby willing to assist Turkey on the issue—which it is not, given Erdogan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric—the resolution now has a much greater chance of passing. Second, Erdogan’s opening to the Kurds has backfired against him. His amnesty offer to the PKK led to a Kurdish political rally when a group of PKK guerrillas returned to Turkey from Iraq, and the Kurdish political party in the Turkish parliament has been banned. Worst of all, the PKK rebellion has heated up with strikes against Turkish officials and army officers all over Turkey,with one of the major attacks originating in Syria, and the Erdogan government has been hard put to suppress the rebellion. According to recent polls, 58% of Turks oppose Erdogan’s Kurdish policy. One of the great ironies of the situation is that Turkey is dependent on Israeli-supplied drones to track the Kurds, and for this reason alone, it is doubtful that whatever his bluster, Erdogan will cut all ties with Israel. It should also be noted that not only has Erdogan alienated the Kurds, he is also unpopular with Turkey’s Alawite community who fear increasing Sunni Islamization of Turkey, and both groups are likely to oppose the AKP in next year’s election. Indeed, before the flotilla incident, the AKP polled only 29%—a sharp drop from the 47% it received in the 2007 elections.
Yet another problem for Erdogan is that the main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, has a new and vibrant leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu. He has criticized Erdogan’s domestic policy as creating an “empire of fear” in Turkey, and has gone so far as to accuse the Erdogan government of being Fascistic. He also raised questions about Erdogan’s links to the IHH and has suggested that the Turkish government could have prevented the flotilla confrontation. Interestingly enough, even within the CHP there have been questions about Erdogan’s policy toward the flotilla incident, including from one of the Party’s spiritual leaders, Fethullah Gulen.
In sum, as next year’s election draws closer, Erdogan may wish to play the Israel card as he seeks reelection. Nonetheless, given his domestic and foreign policy problems, even vitriolic attacks on Israel might not suffice to guarantee an AKP victory
