Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig: News? It’s Also What’s NOT Said or Done
How do you define the “news”? Seems pretty straightforward, right? It’s what someone or some group recently did or said. But that’s only half the picture. Many times the news can be heavily affected by what is not said or done – and that might not be reported at all, despite its huge influence on what does happen afterward. Here are three current Israeli news examples as cases in point.
1) Once again the issue of drafting the ultra-Orthodox (haredim) into the IDF is on the hot political agenda. It might be hard to believe, but this whole issue could have been avoided over 70 years ago if only then PM Ben-Gurion had added one extra word: “only.”
Here’s the story. After the Holocaust, in which the haredim suffered at least as much, if not more, than other Jewish sectors (largely because the European haredi leadership told them to stay put in their countries), the small haredi contingent in Israel turned to Ben-Gurion in 1951 with the request that he permit 400 haredi yeshiva students to continue their Jewish Torah/Talmud studies instead of serving in the Israeli Army – this in order to prevent the closing of the Israeli yeshivot. Given that these institutes for Torah learning had been decimated in Europe in the previous decade – the prime minister who knew the bible inside out and had great sympathy for the Jewish tradition (despite his not being religious at all) – gave his approval for 400 to receive army service exemptions.
The problem became obvious later on. As the haredi community rebounded with its high birth rate, it viewed the “400” as being proportional to its population. Thus, so when the number of Israeli haredim quadrupled, so did the number of exemptions they demanded. Later on, Ben-Gurion (and the IDF in general) did have reservations about this skyrocketing number of exemptions, but had too many other burning issues to bring it to a head politically. Nevertheless in hindsight, had Ben-Gurion stipulated “ONLY 400,” Israel wouldn’t be where it is today: with a massive political (and social) struggle regarding this increasingly critical issue.
2) Benjamin Netanyahu’s court cases continue apace, all the while he continues to serve as Israel’s prime minister. Here two words were missing. The background: in 2001, the Knesset discussed the “Basic Law: The Government” including a provision prohibiting government ministers from serving in office if and when they were under judicial indictment. However, this was not extended to the office of the prime minister.
Why not? Justice Minister Tommy Lapid at the time (the father of today’s Opposition Leader Yair Lapid) argued against including the prime minister in the Basic Law, believing that it would be inconceivable for such a scenario to occur. Well, the “inconceivable” became reality with PM Netanyahu’s triple indictment (the second such case; previous PM Olmert resigned on his own volition after being indicted – ultimately serving jail time). So Israel is now caught in a situation in which its prime minister has to spend a good part of his time (over several years!) in court. All this mess because the words “prime minister” were excluded from the Basic Law (similar but not equivalent to America’s Constitutional Amendments).
3) Despite the “Gaza Agreement” ending the war, Hamas is still circulating in Gaza with weapons, trying to (re)enforce control over the population. How and why is this even possible? Because of what PM Netanyahu did not do over the last year and a half: seriously discuss and work with neutral Arab countries and allies to plan and organize what happens “The Day After.” This lack of pre-planning was especially egregious given that everyone – internally (Mossad, Shabak etc.) and externally (the U.S. et al) – continually urged him to start the process, a strategic necessity. After all (pun intended), what happens post-war is just as important as what occurs during the fighting. The completely different aftermaths of World War 1 and World War 2 were the most famous examples of this: WW1 led to the Nazis’ eventual rise due to the impossible financial burden placed on Germany; WW2 culminated in decades of European peace as a result of America’s Marshall Plan, resuscitating Europe’s economies.
To be sure, not doing anything can also be constructive on occasion. In international relations, sometimes the best move is not to retaliate, thereby de-escalating tensions or enabling the other side’s national dignity to be maintained. For instance, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, President Kennedy did not respond to Soviet provocation and withheld immediate American military reprisal. This proved to be critical in averting nuclear war.
On the individual level as well, each of us can think of examples of our “unsent message” during some argument with a friend or spouse – not texting or calling them despite our anger or frustration. A “time out” provides space for tempers to cool, preventing an escalation that neither side really desires.
The bottom line: inaction is not always a bad thing. It depends on the context and the nature of the conflict. But when dealing with national security, the default should be strategic action with forethought. PM Netanyahu might be using forethought, but it seems to be all about inaction – a recipe for strategic failure.
