Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig: Israel-How to Topple an Elected, but Deeply Unpopular Government
For most Israelis, the recent firing of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant by PM Netanyahu in the middle of a war on several fronts, with another imminent massive Iranian attack in the offing, is the “last straw”. Especially when Gallant is being replaced by someone who has zero experience in military matters – and all this for the PM’s immediate political expedience on an issue that even part of the governing coalition disagrees with exemption from army service for the ultra-Orthodox.
But what can the public do with any real effect? Precisely because the governing parties understand their precarious electoral situation (losing in any upcoming election), none of the partners are willing to jump ship. In other words, the more the public desires new elections, the greater the interest of the governing parties in resisting that wish! A deeply unpopular government that refuses to call for new elections? That’s a “democratic lacuna.”
True, there’s no such thing as a perfect form of democracy. Presidential, prime ministerial, proportional, or direct representation – each system has a “bug” i.e., a feature that’s problematic. It’s the nature of the political game: no political structure can answer all political eventualities and needs. So to repeat: what can be done? First, some critical background.
The original Greek root of the word “democracy” is demos kratos: power (kratos) to the people (demos). However, once a political unit passes several hundred voters (or a few thousand, at most), direct democracy becomes too unwieldy for daily policymaking. That’s when representative democracy enters the picture: voters elect a select few who will (theoretically) represent the public’s wishes. In order not to bother the public too often, and also to prevent policymaking anarchy, such elections are held periodically – in some systems the period set in stone by law (or Constitution), in others with flexibility regarding holding “early” elections.
As with all parliamentary systems, Israel has the latter. Elections must be called within four years (4 years and any months remaining until the month of Heshvan, around October/November). However, of the 25 governments that Israel has had since its establishment, only six (!) have made it through the full four years. In the other cases, the government ceased to function as a whole and called for “early” elections. Thus, one cannot argue that maintaining a government’s full tenure is a “must” for proper governance.
Indeed, a solid argument can be made for the opposite: in various circumstances, the government should fall, and new elections be held. However, in Israeli law only one “side” of the democratic structure can decide this: the Knesset. It has two possibilities: either the ruling government itself calls for new elections with at least 61 votes (a simple majority), or any faction can get 61 MKs to vote “constructive no-confidence” in the Prime Minister, by designating someone else specifically to take the PM’s place (who can then form a different government without elections).
What’s the “problem”? The public (demos) is left out of this process; the real democratic sovereign can’t decide to switch horses midstream – an obvious anomaly if “democracy” wishes to retain its original meaning.
How to resolve this conundrum? One of democracy’s cardinal principles is “checks and balances” – usually related to the relationship between the branches of government. However, there is no reason this can’t or shouldn’t be extended to the relationship between the governed and their governors.
To that end, I propose adding a Constitutional provision to Israel’s Basic Law: The Knesset (1958) and its accompanying regular Israel Elections Law (1969). This could be called the New Elections Referendum, entailing a few elements. First and foremost, the Referendum could be initiated by any MK or any citizen. Second, it must be phrased in simple, straightforward terms: “Do you agree to call for new elections within the coming 100 days?” (Yes / No / Abstain). Third, in order not to encourage frivolous or referenda campaigns with no chance of success, the law would designate that first a certain percentage of registered voters would back the attempt to run such a referendum (for example, 33% or even 50% of registered voters would have to agree to have such a referendum ballot). This would not be financed by the state but only by the initiators.
Fourth, assuming the 33-50% threshold is passed, the actual Referendum campaign would be financed by the state and supervised by the already institutionalized Central Elections Committee (with a Supreme Court Justice at its head). Fifth and finally, the referendum’s “Recall Campaign” will be successful only if it obtains a much higher percent of the vote: I would suggest somewhere between 60% (three-fifths) to 66.7% (two-thirds) of the votes cast – immediately setting in motion an official election campaign for parties in the Knesset, as the present system entails.
One could add one other provision: if the Recall Campaign is successful, that would automatically prevent the reigning prime minister from holding office in the ensuing government – a parallel to the Knesset’s constructive vote of no confidence that already exists in law.
Returning to the present, what would be the result of new elections at this time? As noted above, the surveys have been consistent: total defeat of the current governing coalition, regardless of the party constellation that would run in the election campaign.
This would not set a precedent for future electoral/governing instability. The calamity of Oct. 7 might not have been completely unique (the 1973 Yom Kippur War debacle was similar), but if such a Recall Campaign happens once every fifty years (ironically: the biblical Jubilee number) a working democracy can handle such a once in a lifetime “alternative election initiation” campaign.
Clearly, the present government will not pass such a Referendum Law, but whichever coalition does eventually take its place should be confident enough not to worry that it would be used against it. Even mildly unpopular governments would not be beset by such a campaign, given the high cost of trying to get the Referendum approved – and the very high bar of signatures needed. But if democracy is to survive in times of great stress, a little (electoral) “variable dynamism” can serve as an antidote to massive government unpopularity due to governing sclerosis and/or broad incompetence.
