Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gestures during a meeting of the right-wing bloc at the Knesset in Jerusalem on Nov. 20. GALI TIBBON/AFP via Getty Images
Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig: Bibi the Waiter
We all know the adage: “Better late than never.” Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu has changed that to “better late, forever…”. For the leader of a country that needs decisive decision-making on a regular basis, Bibi has proven to be the antithesis of a firm decision-maker. I offer to you a different description: The Great Procrastinator.
To be sure, caution is a necessary trait for anyone, especially the leader of a country such as Israel, beset by numerous enemies and internal problems. At some point, though, decisions have to be made – and continuing not to decide is not one of them.
Four central examples of such procrastination by PM Netanyahu illustrate the harmful effects of such non-decisionmaking – all related to the Oct. 7th bloodbath and its continuing aftermath.
First and central was Netanyahu’s decision almost a decade ago to halt Israel’s mostly successful attempts to undermine Qatar’s foreign financing of Hamas. Although this might seem to be “decisionmaking,” it was exactly the opposite of that within the wider context of the country’s policy related to the Palestinian question. Bibi’s plan (and hope): Indirectly financing and strengthening Hamas would relatively weaken the Palestinian Administration (PA) by maintaining the animosity and balance of power between these two main Palestinian regimes. For PM Netanyahu, this would enable him to avoid having to make any decisive decisions regarding the Two State Solution peace process.
We now know how that worked out. Instead of (or in addition to) bolstering Hamas vis-à-vis the PA, it also strengthened Hamas’s ability to attack Israel – especially when Bibi, bringing along most of Israel’s defense establishment, was sure that such Hamas financing had “moderated” its goal of destroying Israel.
Which brings us to the second related issue. Post-Oct. 7, Bibi has portrayed the catastrophe as solely a tactical disaster of Israel’s army and security institutions. Given his above-mentioned, already well-known strategic policy mistake, he has refused all calls for setting up an Official Commission of Inquiry that only the Israeli government can establish. The reason is obvious to all – the later such a commission is set up (if ever), the longer he can continue in office. Other than diehard Bibi supporters, no one doubts what such a Commission’s findings will be. Even President Herzog’s reasonable compromise suggestion that the “liberal” President of the Supreme Court (Amit) share the decision with the “conservative” Deputy Chief Justice (Solberg) regarding who will serve on the Commission was recently shot down by the prime minister.
And then there’s the third delaying element. Oct. 7 and the IDF’s partial decimation of Gaza and weakening of Hamas showed that the country needs more able-bodied soldiers, given the huge reserve duty burden carried by tens of thousands of reservists (some in their 40s and even 50s). Thus, the growing call by the defense establishment and the public at large to finally get the ultra-Orthodox to serve as well.
However, here Bibi is stuck between the rock and the hard place within his own government: the haredim refuse to be drafted under any conditions, whereas the national religious camp (all of whom serve with great sacrifice) demand that the law (already mandating such universal army service) be fully implemented. With only a few days left for the annual budget to be passed – if not, new elections are automatically called – we will have to wait and see whether Bibi’s fence straddling on this issue will bring him down (probably not).
Finally, and most tragically, Bibi has been delaying any final decision regarding Israel’s remaining hostages in Gaza. Here, too, he’s caught in a vise: getting all the hostages back means officially ending the war – but then he loses his government with Smotrich and Ben-Gvir’s factions leaving. On the other hand, over 70% of the Israeli public supports such a deal with Hamas, not to mention Bibi’s “patron,” President Trump, who wants all the hostages back as soon as possible. What was PM Netanyahu’s “solution”? Salami tactics: Every few weeks, carry out a “minor-scale” deal freeing a few hostages in return for freeing hundreds of Hamas terrorists in Israeli jail!
But then, recently, the prime minister reached a point of seeming no return. The hostage agreement with Hamas stated that after “Stage 1” was completed satisfactorily (it was), the two sides would immediately start “Stage 2” negotiations entailing the release of all hostages and completely ending the war. Bibi reneged on that by refusing to start “Stage 2”; Hamas viewed that as an abrogation of the overall initial agreement regarding the process. So now Israel has restarted the war – by almost all former military generals’ accounts, something that will only prolong the hostages’ release, if ever. If seventeen months of Gaza’s destruction didn’t free the hostages, why would more firepower now do the job? But the “job” isn’t about the hostages; it’s about releasing the prime minister from being taken hostage politically by Smotrich and Ben-Gvir.
These are but the most important and blatant examples of Bibi’s procrastination (non)moves. One more has been ongoing for several years: in the prime minister’s triple indictment trial process, his defense attornies have employed numerous tricks of the trade to delay the onset of the trial itself – and once it began they’ve “forced” the court to eliminate several days of his taking the stand because of “pressing matters of state.” And this, after explicitly telling the court at the start of his trial that there won’t be any problem for him to attend the trial while running the country.
Bibi would do well to follow the etymological origin of the word “procrastinate.” It stems from the Latin procrastinat, meaning “deferred until the morning” (from the verb procrastinare) – combining pro (“forward”) and crastinus “belonging to tomorrow.” Thinking through important decisions until “tomorrow” is good practice, but kicking the can down the road several years ahead is dangerous – indeed, catastrophic if you’re running a country.
I’ll end with another quote – less well known but no less pithy: “When faced with two equally tough choices, most people choose the third choice: to not choose” (Jarod Kintz). That is quite true, except we don’t expect that from our leaders; they’re in positions of power specifically for the purpose of making decisions.
