Jack Cohen – Memories of War 1973
Ehud Diskin was a Major in the IDF during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. He spoke to us at the AACI Netanya about his experiences during the War which started on Oct 6, 42 years ago. He has written a book entitled “Yes, it’s possible,” about his experiences and has done research that sheds new light on some aspects of the war.
There had been rumors of war, but few really took them seriously. The Israeli Govt. was warned exactly when the war would start, both by King Hussein of Jordan himself and by the son-in-law of Pres. Sadat of Egypt, who was an Israeli spy. But the Head of Israeli Military Intelligence Gen. Zeira, in the biggest blunder in Israeli history, ignored these warnings, believing with total arrogance that the Egyptians would never attack. But on the afternoon of Oct 6 he was proven wrong. Luckily some officers had ignored his orders and had prepared and mobilized their units ready for the attack.
Diskin realized there was something up when he saw army jeeps being driven around on Yom Kippur. He called an army buddy and his wife told him that he had already joined up and was somewhere in the north. So Diskin went to try to volunteer, since he had left the reserves 6 months earlier. But, what he found was chaos and no-one knew where to put him. He went to the IDF HQ in Tel Aviv and tried to volunteer there, but they told him he was too senior, so he accepted a lower job as an assistant to a Brigade Commander. Luckily the Brigade Commander turned out to be his former commander and he was put in charge of a Task Force of 6 tanks and 10 half-track troop carriers and told to go directly to the Suez Canal. Before he left he checked the tanks and found they had no machine guns. He tried to requisition some but could not. So he had an idea.
On the way to the Suez Canal his group had to cross the Egyptian border. At a remote place called Shivta, an ancient Nabatean site and an army post, there was a tank training school where he had trained. He stopped there and asked if they had any machine guns. They did, four per tank. So he said he was going to take one from each tank (since they only required two at most). The officer in charge of the school was reluctant, but Diskin said he was from the same Division and he signed the form and took them. That’s what distinguished the IDF soldiers, adaptability under pressure.
When they got to the Canal the next morning they found immediately that the Egyptian soldiers were fighting well and would not give ground. After three attempts to break through and many casualties, they gave up. He was then attached to Gen. Ariel Sharon’s Division as a Brigade Commander and immediately promoted to Colonel and given the task of turning to the south and trying to break through to the Canal there. Army intelligence had discovered a gap in the Egyptian defences on the other side of the canal between the Second and Third Egyptian Armies.
In fact the gap was 6 km wide, and their move to take advantage of that gap was a secret. But, there were many on the Israeli side, including the top political leaders, PM Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who were against Sharon’s idea of crossing the canal and attacking the Egyptians from behind. Also, many thought that under the circumstances of chaos and war Sharon would never be able to manage such a difficult and dangerous maneuver. Eventually Sharon was given the OK, and was able to find and bring in a bridge, that unfortunately got stuck in the sand. So they improvized, they floated the tanks across the canal in darkness on pontoons. His was the first Brigade to cross the Canal. Once they had six tanks on the other side they started to build up their beachhead, bringing in supplies and men.
From then on the war changed completely, they were able to roll up the entire west side of the Canal and destroy the anti-air missiles, which freed the IAF to make its deadly attacks on the Egyptian armor, and soon the IDF was 100 km from Cairo. Once the Egyptian Third Army was surrounded Sadat had no choice but to ask for a ceasefire, and this subsequently led to the Egyptian-Israel Peace agreement signed in 1979.
He made two points about the war. Chief of the IAF Benny Peled prepared the planes to make a preemptive strike on the Egyptian and Syrian forces in the 24 hr before they attacked. But, a previously unknown secret agreement was made between Kissinger and Meir and Dayan that Israel would not do this as they had in 1967. Sadat had assured Kissinger that if the IAF made no preemptive attack he would be willing to make a ceasefire with Israel. However, Peled made a huge mistake, when he was ordered not to attack he ordered the planes to be deactivated, i.e. all their armaments removed. Thus, when the Arabs did attack the air force was unprepared and there was a delay of some hours before they could respond.
Also, he pointed out that Sharon, who was a superb General, never attacked the strong points of the enemy. He always found a way around them in order to attack them from the rear. He did this at the Mitla Pass in Sinai in the 1967 Six Day war and he did this at the Canal in 1973. Diskin criticized the recent Israeli Protective Edge campaign in Gaza, saying that they chose to attack the Hamas stronghold of Sajawiya, causing the loss of many IDF lives, rather than go around it. Although the 1973 war started in chaos on the Israeli side, the fact that the ordinary soldiers and officers managed to bring order out of this chaos and respond with adaptability and bravery made all the difference.
Born in London, UK, lived in suburban Washington DC area for 30 years, moved to Israel in 1996. He has a web site: Jack’s Blog
Jack Cohen – Memories of War 1973
