Statue of David Ben-Gurion in Rishon LeZion, Israel. Photo: Wiki Commons. Upon the 40th anniversary of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s death, Israeli and American policy-makers should study the 1948 legacy of Israel’s Founding Father: Defiance of disproportionate U.S. pressure forged Israel into a national security producer rather than a national security consumer, catapulted the Jewish state into the most productive U.S. strategic ally, enhanced the long-term U.S.-Israel mutually beneficial ties (following short-term tension), and advanced the national security of both the U.S. and Israel.
Yoram Ettinger is a former ambassador and head of “Second Thought: a U.S.-Israel initiative.”
On May 29, 1949, toward the end of Israel’s War of Independence, which consumed 6,000 Israeli lives (1 percent of the population!), the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, James McDonald, delivered a scolding message from President Harry Truman to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. According to McDonald, Truman “interpreted Israel’s attitude [rejecting the land-for-peace principle; annexing West Jerusalem; refusing to absorb Arab refugees; pro-actively soliciting a massive Jewish ingathering] as dangerous to peace and as indicating disregard of the U.N. General Assembly resolutions of November 29, 1947 [the partition plan] and December 11, 1948 [refugees and internationalization of Jerusalem], reaffirming insistence that territorial compensation should be made [by Israel] for territory taken in excess of November 29 [40% beyond the partition plan!], and that tangible refugee concessions should be made [by Israel] now as essential, preliminary to any prospect for general settlement. The operative part of the note was the implied threat that the U.S. would reconsider its attitude toward Israel,” (“My Mission in Israel 1948-1951,” James McDonald).
Ben-Gurion’s response — with a population of 650,000 Jews, a $1 billion gross domestic product and a slim military force in 1949, compared with 6.3 million Jews, a $260 billion GDP and one of the world’s finest military forces in 2013 — was resolute, as described by McDonald: “[Truman’s] note was unrealistic and unjust. It ignored the facts that the partition resolution was no longer applicable since its basic conditions had been destroyed by Arab aggression which the Jews successfully resisted. … To whom should we turn if Israel were again attacked? Would the U.S. send arms or troops? The United States is a powerful country; Israel is a small and a weak one. We can be crushed, but we will not commit suicide.”
McDonald further wrote: “Two U.N. Security Council resolutions passed [with U.S. support] have implicitly threatened sanctions if Israeli troops were not withdrawn [from the ‘occupied Negev’].” Ben-Gurion reacted defiantly: “Israel has been attacked by six Arab States. As a small country, Israel must reserve the right of self-defense even if it goes down fighting. … As Ben-Gurion once put it to me, ‘What Israel has won on the battlefield, it is determined not to yield at the [U.N. Security] Council table.’”
As a result of Ben-Gurion’s determined stance, “there was apparently indecision and much heart-searching in Washington…. Our [responding] note abandoned completely the stern tone of its predecessor. … Fists and knuckles were unclenched. … The crisis was past. The next few months marked a steady retreat from the intransigence of the United States’ May note. … Washington ceased to lay down the law to Tel Aviv.”
On the eve of the declaration of independence, General George Marshall, Second World War hero and Secretary of State, who was then the most charismatic office-holder in the U.S., sent Ben-Gurion a brutal ultimatum, demanding the postponement of the declaration of independence and acceptance of a U.N. Trusteeship. Marshall, along with Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, the CIA and the top Foggy Bottom bureaucrats imposed a regional military embargo, while Britain supplied arms to Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. They contended that a declaration of independence would turn the oil-producing Arab countries against the U.S., at a time when the threat of a Third World War (USSR vs U.S.) was hovering, which could force the U.S. to fight an oil-starved war. They threatened that Ben-Gurion’s unilateral declaration of independence would trigger a war, which could doom the Jewish people to a second Holocaust in less than ten years, since the U.S. would not provide any assistance to the Jewish state. They contemplated an expanded embargo — unilaterally or multilaterally — should Ben-Gurion ignore the ultimatum.
Ben-Gurion did not blink. McDonald wrote that “[Ben-Gurion] added that much as Israel desired friendship with the U.S., there were limits beyond which it could not go. … Ben-Gurion warned President Truman and the Department of State, through me, that they would be gravely mistaken if they assumed that the threat, or even the use of U.N. sanctions, would force Israel to yield on issues considered vital to its independence and security. … [He] left no doubt that he was determined to resist, at whatever cost, ‘unjust and impossible demands.’ On these he could not compromise.”
Ben-Gurion’s tenacity was vindicated when Israel was admitted to the U.N., despite its rejection of the land-for-peace, Jerusalem and refugees demands, “evidence of the growth of respect for Israel,” McDonald wrote. Moreover, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was a delegate to the U.N. in 1949, admitted that the partition plan and the anti-Israel “Bernadotte U.N. plan” were not adequate and that the U.S. underestimated the Jewish muscle and determination. General Omar Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed to consider Israel as a major ally of the U.S.
Ben-Gurion was aware that fending off pressure constituted an integral part of Jewish history, a prerequisite for survival and long-term growth, militarily, diplomatically and economically. On the other hand, succumbing to pressure intensifies further pressure, threatening to transform Israel from a unique strategic asset to a liability. On a rainy day, the U.S. would rather have a defiant — and not a vacillating — ally.
This article was originally published by Israel Hayom.
